バートランド・ラッセル『人間の知識-その範囲と限界』序論の最後
* 出典:バートランド・ラッセル(著),鎮目恭夫(訳)『人間の知識-その範囲と限界』(みすず書房,1960年2月(上巻)及び5月(下巻)。上巻=365pp.;下巻=412pp.)* 原著: Human Knowledge, its scope and limits, 1948
序論の最後 |
Introduction | |||
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That scientific inference requires, for its validity, principles which experience cannot render even probable, is, I believe, an inescapable conclusion from the logic of probability. For empiricism, it is an awkward conclusion. But I think it can be rendered somewhat more palatable by the analysis of the concept of “knowledge” undertaken in Part II . “Knowledge”, in my opinion, is a much less precise concept than is generally thought, and has its roots more deeply embedded in unverbalized animal behaviour than most philosophers have been willing to admit. The logically basic assumptions to which our analysis leads us are psychologically the end of a long series of refinements which start from habits of expectation in animals, such as that what has a certain kind of smell will be good to eat. To ask, therefore, whether we “know” the postulates of scientific inference, is not so definite a question as it seems. The answer must be: in one sense, yes, in another sense, no; but in the sense in which “no” is the right answer we know nothing whatever, and “knowledge” in this sense is a delusive vision. The perplexities of philosophers are due, in a large measure, to their unwillingness to awaken from this blissful dream. |